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Abstract 
This study concerns the risks of privacy disclosure when sharing and releasing a dataset in which 
each individual may be associated with multiple records. Existing data privacy approaches and 
policies typically assume that each individual in a shared dataset corresponds to a single record, 
leading to an underestimation of the disclosure risks in multiple records per person scenarios. We 
propose two novel measures of privacy disclosure to arrive at a more appropriate assessment of 
disclosure risks. The first measure assesses individual-record disclosure risk based upon the 
frequency distribution of individuals’ occurrences. The second measure assesses sensitive-attribute 
disclosure risk based upon the number of individuals affiliated with a sensitive value. We show that 
the two proposed disclosure measures generalize the well-known k-anonymity and l-diversity 
measures, respectively, and work for scenarios with either a single record or multiple records per 
person. We have developed an efficient computational procedure that integrates the two proposed 
measures and a data quality measure to anonymize the data with multiple records per person when 
sharing and releasing the data for research and analytics. The results of the experimental evaluation 
using real-world data demonstrate the advantage of the proposed approach over existing techniques 
for protecting privacy while preserving data quality. 
Keywords: Data Privacy, k-Anonymity, l-Diversity, Gini Index, kd-Trees 
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1 Introduction 
Recent developments in business analytics and big 
data technologies enable organizations to share and 
analyze large amounts of various types of personal data 
(Abbasi, Sarker, & Chiang, 2016; Chen, Chiang, & 
Storey, 2012; Maass et al.; 2018). This has caused 
growing concerns about individual privacy, leading to 
tightened privacy laws and regulations, such as the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) recently 
introduced by the European Union (EU 2016). Privacy 
disclosure risk arises in many business analytics and 
big data applications, including the sharing of patient 
records among different healthcare providers, the 
distribution of online review data for product 
recommendations and personalized services, and the 
sharing of online purchase behavior data by e-
commerce companies (Cavusoglu et al. 2016; 
Kordzadeh & Warren, 2017; Menon & Sarkar 2016). 
These applications typically involve combining data 
records from different sources or integrating records of 
individuals from different temporal and/or geographic 
points within the same data source. An essential aspect 
in these applications is that each individual typically 
corresponds to multiple records, a situation referred to 
as multiple records per person (MRPP) in this paper. 
MRPP scenarios are very common in big data 
applications where data are often stored in different 
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types of databases. While the use of MRPP enhances 
the value of the data, it also increases the level of 
disclosure risk. This work examines privacy disclosure 
risk in MRPP scenarios, a problem that has not been 
adequately addressed in the literature and in practice. 
Multiple records per person is very common in health 
information systems. A representative example is the 
Rochester Epidemiology Project (REP), led by the 
Mayo Clinic (Rocca et al., 2012; Sauver et al., 2012). 
The REP is a collaboration of clinics, hospitals, and 
other medical facilities in Minnesota and Wisconsin in 
the US for sharing medical records for research and 
public health service. The REP system connects patient 
medical records across all participating medical 
providers. Specifically, multiple records of a patient 
collected by different medical providers are linked 
with a patient ID in the system. With linked records, 
the system can be used to improve continuity of care 
and to study hospital readmission problems. When the 
system is applied to a large group of patients over an 
extended time period, it also supports more general 
research into disease trends in the community. The 
REP data are available to both participating health 
organizations and external medical researchers and 
have been used to support more than 2,000 
publications across a wide range of diseases. There are 
also several other systems similar to REP in other 
regions of the US (Rocca et al., 2012). 
Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the REP display 
(provided by Sauver et al., 2012). It is clear that a 
patient often has multiple records in the system. To 
protect patient privacy when releasing the data to a 
third party, REP follows the policies specified in the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) by de-identifying the records before 
releasing them (DHHS, 2000). To comply with 
HIPAA policy, all personally identifiable fields in 
Figure 1 are removed for public access. The fields that 
remain available include patient demographics (e.g., 
gender, birth year, etc.) and medical information (e.g., 
disease, treatment, etc.). HIPAA de-identification 
policies, however, may be insufficient in protecting 
patient privacy (Sweeney, 2002), particularly when 
each patient has multiple records in the released data 
(to be discussed later). 
The MRPP setting also appears in many other data 
releasing and sharing applications. In a widely 
publicized incident, Netflix awarded one million 
dollars to a team led by two AT&T employees for 
winning a contest to improve the predictive accuracy 
of the company’s movie recommendation system by 
over 10%. The contest, which attracted thousands of 
participants and lasted for three years, was considered 
a big success in data mining and business analytics. 
Once the winners were declared, Netflix immediately 
announced plans for another contest. A few months 
later, however, the company canceled the plans when 
it was found that the de-identified data released for the 
contest, which included movie names and ratings 
associated with customers, could, in fact, be used to 
reidentify the customers. The cancellation was 
necessary in order to settle a class-action lawsuit on 
privacy violations (Lohr, 2010). In the data provided 
by Netflix, each movie viewer typically has many 
movie-viewing records that are linked by a viewer ID. 
This record linkage is necessary because the 
recommendation system needs to analyze the 
associations of movies viewed and rated by a viewer in 
a certain time period. With multiple linked records, 
however, disclosure risk increases significantly. 
 
 
Figure 1. A Screenshot of the REP Display (Source: Sauver et al., 2012, p. 1621) 
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In the above examples, there are three parties involved 
from a privacy perspective: (1) the data-owner 
organization(s) (e.g., REP and Netflix) who wants to 
make the data available to third-party users while 
protecting the privacy of the individuals involved; (2) 
individuals (e.g., REP patients and Netflix customers) 
whose personal data were collected by the data-owner 
organization and who want their private information 
protected; and (3) third-party data users (e.g., medical 
researchers outside REP and the Netflix data 
recipients) who want to use the data acquired from the 
data owner to perform data analysis and research. 
When a data user attempts to use the acquired data to 
reveal individuals’ private information, the user is 
called an adversary. This study focuses on how the 
data-owner organization can release useful data to 
third-party users while preserving the privacy of the 
individuals involved. 
When released data include personal information, a 
common practice to address privacy concerns is to de-
identify the data before their release. De-identification 
removes direct identifiers such as individuals’ names, 
phone numbers, and addresses. It is a primary approach 
in HIPAA’s privacy rule (DHHS, 2000). However, it 
has been shown that de-identification alone does not 
sufficiently protect against identity disclosure 
(Samarati & Sweeney, 1998; Sweeney, 2002). Some 
combinations of demographic attributes, such as age, 
gender, and zip code, can be used to reidentify 
individuals from a de-identified dataset (Xu, 2007). In 
fact, Sweeney (2002) found out that 87% of the 
population in the United States can be uniquely 
identified with three demographic attributes—gender, 
date of birth, and five-digit zip code—which are 
accessible from some publicly available data sources, 
such as voter registration records. These publicly 
available or easily accessible attributes are called 
quasi-identifiers (QIs). Often, QI attributes are useful 
for data analysis and need to be included in the released 
data. To prevent privacy disclosure, a well-known 
technique called k-anonymity (Samarati & Sweeney, 
1998; Sweeney, 2002) generalizes the QI attribute 
values so that each record in a released dataset cannot 
be distinguished among at least k records based on the 
QI attribute values. A group of records sharing the 
same QI values is referred to as a QI-group. 
This study seeks to assess and mitigate disclosure risks 
when releasing data with multiple records per person. 
Following the convention in literature, the released 
dataset is typically de-identified and includes two 
types of attributes: (1) quasi-identifier (QI) attributes, 
which are normally not considered as confidential by 
individuals, such as age, gender, and zip code. 
However, the values of the QI attributes can often be 
obtained from public sources that also contain 
identifying attributes. So, these QI attributes can be 
used by an adversary to reidentify the individuals in the 
de-identified data released, resulting in identity 
disclosure. (2) Sensitive attributes, which contain 
private information that an individual typically does 
not want revealed, such as income, disease, and sexual 
orientation. The QI attributes, such as age, gender, and 
zip code, can be obtained (along with identifying 
attributes) from many data sources, including public 
sources (e.g., voter registration records) and 
commercial sources (e.g., data vendors that sell 
consumer data). In some cases, the adversary knows 
the QI attributes of the target because they are 
colleagues, friends, or neighbors. Because of these 
realistic scenarios, in the data privacy literature 
(Samarati & Sweeney, 1998; Machanavajjhala et al., 
2006; Fung et al., 2010; Li & Sarkar, 2011; Li & 
Sarkar, 2013; El Emam et al., 2013), it is normally 
assumed that the adversary knows the QI attribute 
values of the target individuals but not the sensitive 
attribute values. The adversary then attempts to 
disclose the sensitive values based on the information 
in the QI attributes. We adopt the same assumption in 
this study. 
For the purposes of analyzing privacy-disclosure risk, 
the literature describes two types of disclosure 
(Duncan & Lambert, 1989; Li & Sarkar, 2014): (1) 
identity disclosure, or reidentification, in which an 
adversary is able to match a record in a dataset to an 
individual, and (2) sensitive-attribute disclosure, in 
which an adversary is able to deduce the sensitive- 
attribute value(s) of an individual record, even without 
knowing the identity of the individual. The k-
anonymity model considers the reidentification risk 
but not the attribute disclosure risk. Therefore, even 
when the reidentification risk of an individual is 
sufficiently limited in a QI-group, attribute disclosure 
may still occur when there is little diversity in the 
values for a sensitive attribute. To address this 
problem, the l-diversity principle was proposed 
(Machanavajjhala et al. 2006), which requires that 
each QI-group contains at least one well-represented 
(relatively balanced) sensitive value so that sensitive 
values are sufficiently diversified. 
k-anonymity, l-diversity, and other existing methods 
for privacy-preserving data release, including official 
privacy policy like HIPAA, all assume that each 
individual corresponds to a single record (Fung et al., 
2010). When multiple records in a dataset are 
associated with the same individual, a QI-group of k 
records may contain fewer than k individuals. Also, 
sensitive values in a QI-group in an MRPP setting may 
not be distributed as diversified, as in a single record 
per person setting, even if the group satisfies l-
diversity. As a result, k-anonymity and l-diversity do 
not provide intended privacy protections in MRPP 
cases, as they do in single-record cases. 
This study is designed to address the limitations of the 
existing well-known privacy techniques, namely k-
Protecting Privacy with Multiple Records per Person  
 
1464 
anonymity and l-diversity, when an individual has 
multiple records in a dataset. We propose two novel 
disclosure-risk measures for the MRPP setting. The 
first measure, called g-balance, assesses the identity 
disclosure risk of an individual record, while the 
second measure, called h-affiliation, assesses 
sensitive-attribute disclosure risk. Based on these two 
measures, we develop an efficient algorithm for 
protecting against both identity and attribute 
disclosures in MRPP cases. Our work follows the same 
assumption in the literature; that is, the adversary 
knows the QI attribute values of the target individual 
who is in the released dataset, and attempts to disclose 
the sensitive values of the target based on the known 
QI information. In terms of data anonymization, it is a 
common practice to protect against identity disclosure 
by applying anonymization techniques to QI attributes 
while keeping sensitive attributes unchanged (DHHS, 
2000; Fung et al., 2010). We follow the same practice 
in this study. 
This work makes a contribution to data privacy 
research and practice in several ways. First, we 
investigate an important problem that has largely been 
overlooked in the literature. While it is common to see 
multiple records per person in many data-sharing 
applications, little attention has been devoted to the 
study of related privacy-disclosure problems. Our 
study fills this gap in the literature. Second, we propose 
two novel metrics for measuring individual-record 
disclosure and attribute-disclosure risks, respectively, 
in MRPP cases. We show that the two proposed 
measures generalize the well-known k-anonymity and 
l-diversity measures, and work for cases involving 
either a single record or multiple records per person. 
We develop an efficient algorithm that integrates the 
two proposed metrics and a data-utility metric for 
anonymizing data in MRPP scenarios. Third, we 
validate the effectiveness of the proposed approach 
using real-world data and demonstrate that the 
proposed approach is superior to existing techniques 
for protecting privacy while preserving data quality for 
releasing data with multiple records per person. 
2 An Illustrative Example 
Consider the hypothetical examples shown in Tables 1 
and 2. Table 1 shows the data stored in the electronic 
medical records (EMR) system of a medical provider, 
Franklin Center for Lung Diseases, and Table 2 shows 
the data stored in the EMR system of another provider, 
Lexington Gastroenterology Clinic. We can see that 
many patients have multiple records, either within a 
system or across different systems. Notice that because 
the records were collected at different times, a patient 
may have different age or ZIP values in different 
records. Some of these attributes, such as age, gender, 
ZIP, and disease, are to be included in a data repository 
for data sharing or public access. Because of various 
technical, organizational, and policy issues, there are 
also many attributes or items that might not be shared, 
including patient and physician names, detailed dates, 
and addresses. Some medical information, such as 
clinical narrative, lab test report, radiology images, and 
treatment details associated with each patient visit, 
may or may not be shared depending on the sharing 
agreement. The aggregated data are shown in Table 3a, 
where patient names are listed for easy illustration 
only. 
Using k-anonymity, the dataset will be divided into 
some QI-groups, each containing at least k records. For 
practical reasons, it is also required that the same 
person’s records should be grouped into the same QI-
group. There are many approaches to grouping data, 
but the common idea is to group the data such that the 
records within a QI-group are as close to each other as 
possible by some distance measure calculated based on 
the QI-attribute values. After the grouping, the QI 
values of all records within a group are generalized into 
the same value, using the group’s value domain or 
range to make the records within a group 
indistinguishable.  
 
Table 1. Data from Franklin Center for Lung Diseases 
Admission 
no. 
Name Age Gender ZIP Disease Physician 
Other data in Franklin Center EMR 
System 
1001 Ashley 86 Female 20375 Asthma Dr. Cox 
Example data include 
clinical narratives, 
lab test reports, 
radiology images, 
and/or treatment details 
associated with each patient visit 
1002 Charlie 69 Male 20048 Pneumonia Dr. Khan 
1003 Harry 74 Male 20400 Asthma Dr. Cox 
1004 Harry 75 Male 20400 Bronchitis Dr. Cox 
1005 Charlie 70 Male 20048 Pneumonia Dr. Khan 
1006 Charlie 71 Male 20048 Pneumonia Dr. Khan 
1007 Edward 84 Male 20090 Pneumonia Dr. Smith 
1008 Fred 78 Male 20400 Pneumonia Dr. Smith 
1009 Harry 76 Male 20400 Asthma Dr. Patel 
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Table 2. Data from Lexington Gastroenterology Clinic 
Admission 
no. 
Name Age Gender ZIP Disease Physician 
Other data in Lexington Clinic EMR 
System 
2001 Ashley 86 Female 20375 Reflux Dr. Jones 
Example data include 
clinical narratives, 
lab test reports, 
radiology images, 
and/or treatment details 
associated with each patient visit 
2002 Bob 85 Male 20375 Reflux Dr. Jones 
2003 Charlie 71 Male 20048 Gastritis Dr. Moore 
2004 Diana 84 Female 20090 Ulcer Dr. Taylor 
2005 Charlie 71 Male 20048 Gastritis Dr. Moore 
2006 Diana 84 Female 20090 Gastritis Dr. Moore 
2007 Edward 84 Male 20090 Gastritis Dr. Moore 
2008 Greg 78 Male 20420 Ulcer Dr. Taylor 
2009 Harry 74 Male 20400 Ulcer Dr. Brown 
2010 Harry 76 Male 20400 Ulcer Dr. Brown 
Table 3. Aggregated Data 
a. Original data  b. Anonymized data 
Admission 
no. 
Name Age Gender ZIP Disease  
QI-
Group 
Age Gender ZIP Disease 
1001 Ashley 86 Female 20375 Asthma  1 85-86 * 20375 Asthma 
2001 Ashley 86 Female 20375 Reflux  1 85-86 * 20375 Reflux 
2002 Bob 85 Male 20375 Reflux  1 85-86 * 20375 Reflux 
1002 Charlie 69  Male 20048 Pneumonia  2 69-71 Male 20048 Pneumonia 
1005 Charlie 70 Male 20048 Pneumonia  2 69-71 Male 20048 Pneumonia 
1006 Charlie 71 Male 20048 Pneumonia  2 69-71 Male 20048 Pneumonia 
2003 Charlie 71 Male 20048 Gastritis  2 69-71 Male 20048 Gastritis 
2005 Charlie 71 Male 20048 Gastritis  2 69-71 Male 20048 Gastritis 
2004 Diana 84 Female 20090 Ulcer  3 84 * 20090 Ulcer 
2006 Diana 84 Female 20090 Gastritis  3 84 * 20090 Gastritis 
1007 Edward 84 Male 20090 Pneumonia  3 84 * 20090 Pneumonia 
2007 Edward 84 Male 20090 Gastritis  3 84 * 20090 Gastritis 
1008 Fred 78 Male 20400 Pneumonia  4 74-78 Male 20400-20420 Pneumonia 
2008 Greg 78 Male 20420 Ulcer  4 74-78 Male 20400-20420 Ulcer 
1003 Harry 74 Male 20400 Asthma  4 74-78 Male 20400-20420 Asthma 
1004 Harry 75 Male 20400 Bronchitis  4 74-78 Male 20400-20420 Bronchitis 
1009 Harry 76 Male 20400 Asthma  4 74-78 Male 20400-20420 Asthma 
2009 Harry 74 Male 20400 Ulcer  4 74-78 Male 20400-20420 Ulcer 
2010 Harry 76 Male 20400 Ulcer  4 74-78 Male 20400-20420 Ulcer 
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If generalization is impossible or inappropriate, the QI 
values will be suppressed. Table 3b is a k-anonymized 
version of Table 3a with k = 3. The records within a 
group are very close to each other in terms of the values 
of the QI attributes of age, gender, and ZIP. For 
example, Diana and Edward’s four records are grouped 
together (in Group 3) because they share the same age 
and ZIP values. However, their genders are different 
and must be suppressed because there is no meaningful 
way to generalize them. Ashley and Bob are grouped 
together in a similar manner. Note that Fred and Greg 
are extremely close, but they cannot form a group 
because of the 3-anonymity requirement, so they are 
grouped together with Harry. 
Although Table 3b satisfies the 3-anonymity 
requirement, some records in the anonymized data can 
be easily reidentified. Consider an adversary who 
knows Charlie’s QI attribute values (i.e., age, gender 
and ZIP code values in Group 2 of Table 3b). This 
adversary also knows that Charlie is in the dataset 
(which is easy to know for a system like REP because 
the system covers all the residents in the region). If the 
adversary randomly selects one of the five records in 
Group 2, he would successfully identify one of 
Charlie’s records. In this study, we do not assume that 
the adversary knows the number of records a target 
individual has. However, disclosure is deemed to occur 
when any one of an individual’s records is identified. 
We can also apply this principle to assess the 
disclosure risks of each of the other individuals in the 
dataset. For example, in the last group, Harry is 
associated with five out of seven records while Fred 
and Greg have only one record each. Assume that the 
adversary knew Harry’s QI attribute values, and also 
Fred’s and Greg’s values. Then, by random guessing, 
the adversary would have a much higher probability of 
successfully matching one of Harry’s records versus 
Fred’s or Greg’s record. Thus, through random 
guessing, Harry has a higher disclosure risk than Fred 
or Greg, even if the adversary does not know that Harry 
has more records than Fred or Greg. 
When each individual corresponds to a single record, 
the probability of linking a target to a specific 
individual using QI values is, at most, 1/𝑘  in a k-
anonymized table. When an individual may have 
multiple records, the individual-record disclosure risk 
can be assessed based on the individual’s record 
frequency. In a QI-group containing k individuals, let 
 𝑓𝑖  be the number of records associated with the 𝑖 th 
individual, the individual-record disclosure risk can be 
assessed by 𝑓𝑖 ∑ 𝑓𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1⁄ . The dataset in Table 3b 
satisfies 3-anonymity, but the probability of 
successfully matching a record in the dataset to an 
individual may be higher than 1/3. For example, the 
probability of matching a record in the second group to 
Charlie is 100%; for Harry’s records, the probability of 
matching is 5/7. 
Next, we consider attribute-disclosure risk in MRPP 
cases. As indicated, the l-diversity assumes a single 
record per person; it is thus not effective for reducing 
attribute-disclosure risk in MRPP scenarios. For Group 
2 in Table 3b, for example, even though the group is 2-
diverse, the sensitive values, pneumonia, and gastritis, 
can be disclosed individually or together. This is 
because both values are affiliated with the same 
patient, Charlie, whose records can thus be easily 
reidentified. 
As explained above, in applications with multiple 
records per person, data users often want to observe 
how conditions or preferences of a person change over 
time, or they may want to analyze how different 
behaviors or outcomes co-occur for the same 
individual. In such cases, it is necessary to link the 
multiple records of the same person with a person 
identifier (PID). A PID is a system-generated number 
or label that uniquely (but anonymously) determines a 
person. 
To illustrate the sensitive-attribute disclosure problem 
across different individuals in an MRPP scenario, 
consider Table 4, taken from Group 3 in Table 3b. For 
illustration purposes, we use the first letter of the 
patient’s name as the PID value (which is unlikely to 
be the case in real applications). Because the group 
contains at least three distinct sensitive values, it 
satisfies the basic requirement of l-diversity where l=3. 
However, an adversary who finds that his or her target 
(Diana or Edward) is in this group will know that the 
target has gastritis even though the adversary does not 
know which PID corresponds to the target. This is 
because both patients in the group have gastritis.  
Table 4. An l-Diverse QI-Group Vulnerable to Sensitive-Attribute Disclosure 
PID Age Gender ZIP Disease 
D 84 * 20090 Ulcer 
D 84 * 20090 Gastritis 
E 84 * 20090 Pneumonia 
E 84 * 20090 Gastritis 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
 
1467 
 
A similar problem can be seen in Group 4 of Table 3b. 
Although four different diseases exist in the sensitive 
attribute, two patients (i.e., Greg and Harry) have 
ulcers. As two out of three patients are affiliated with 
the same disease, the likelihood of a patient in the 
group having the disease is 66.7%, which is higher than 
any commonly acceptable risk level. Therefore, when 
individuals have multiple records with multiple 
sensitive values, even if the values in a QI-group 
appear to be diverse, an adversary may still infer the 
individuals’ sensitive values with a high probability 
because of the broad affiliation of a sensitive value 
with different individuals in the group. In short, l-
diversity is not an appropriate criterion for assessing 
attribute-disclosure risk in an MRPP scenario. 
It appears that some of the MRPP problems illustrated 
above may be addressed by way of database 
decomposition. For example, Table 3 could be 
decomposed into two relational tables. The first table 
would contain the PID and QI attributes (age, gender, 
and ZIP code) and the second table would contain the 
attributes of PID and disease. The two tables could be 
joined by the PID to create Table 3. Applying k-
anonymity to the first table would ensure that each QI-
group has at least k individuals. This way, Charlie 
would not appear alone in a QI-group. However, this 
post-decomposition k-anonymity method would not 
reduce the individual-record disclosure risk for the 
other groups in Table 3, because the final released 
dataset would be in a multiple record per person 
format. Similarly, applying l-diversity to the second 
table would not address the sensitive-attribute 
disclosure problem illustrated in Table 4. Furthermore, 
as mentioned at the beginning of the paper, this study 
considers applications where data are not necessarily 
stored in relational databases. In this situation, 
decomposition may not be practical because of the lack 
of well-defined database schema. 
3 Related Work 
k-anonymity is a privacy model designed to prevent or 
mitigate the reidentification problem based on QI 
attributes (Sweeney, 2002). With k-anonymity, when 
an adversary attempts to identify an individual in a 
dataset using QI values, the individual cannot be linked 
to a particular record with a probability higher than 1/k. 
However, individuals in a k-anonymized group can 
still be subject to high attribute disclosure risk if their 
sensitive attribute values are the same or similar. In this 
case, the adversary can disclose the sensitive 
information of the target individual with certainty or 
high probability, even though the adversary cannot tell 
which record in the dataset corresponds to the target 
individual. To address this issue, the l-diversity model 
has been proposed (Machanavajjhala et al., 2006), 
which requires that a sensitive attribute includes at 
least l well-represented values in each group of 
anonymized data. Further details and developments 
with respect to anonymization techniques can be found 
in Fung et al. (2010). Essentially all of the existing 
approaches to anonymization assume that each 
individual corresponds to a single record. 
Many real-world datasets, such as patient visitation 
records, account transactions, and online reviews and 
ratings, often consist of multiple records for the same 
individual (El Emam et al., 2009, El Emam et al., 
2013). In these cases, k-anonymity and l-diversity 
approaches are not appropriate for assessing or 
mitigating the disclosure risk. El Emam et al. (2009) 
conducted a case study to evaluate the reidentification 
risks of patients using a real pharmacy prescription 
dataset containing individuals with multiple records. 
They reported that reidentification risks for the 
individuals in the dataset were quite high. The study, 
however, does not propose a privacy model for 
handling MRPP problems. 
There have been a few studies concerning problems 
related to privacy disclosure in MRPP applications. 
Wang and Fung (2006) address the privacy disclosure 
problem in sequentially released multiple datasets. 
They assume that each dataset is a different projection 
of the same underlying database. The privacy problem 
considered depends on the presence of a sensitive 
attribute and the study only concerns attribute 
disclosure. Our study addresses problems related to 
both identity and attribute disclosure, as discussed 
above. We investigate the record-identification 
problem based on the chance of finding an individual’s 
record in a dataset, which is unrelated to the presence 
of a sensitive attribute. In addition, we do not assume 
that multiple data releases include different projections 
of the same database. 
Nergiz, Clifton, and Nergiz (2007) discuss 
anonymization issues with multiple relational tables. 
Their approach assumes a restrictive relational 
database schema. The privacy problem is also 
contingent upon the presence of sensitive attributes. In 
addition, the approach assumes that a domain 
generalization hierarchy can be defined for the values 
of the QI attributes. Our work does not assume a 
relational database schema, and, as explained above, 
the problem we study cannot be addressed by 
decomposing relational tables and then applying k-
anonymity and l-diversity principles to the 
decomposed tables. Also, our approach does not rely 
on a known domain generalization hierarchy. 
To address the MRPP disclosure problem, Tao et al. 
(2008) propose an approach that ensures that every QI-
group contains at least K individuals or PIDs, each 
having one or more records. We call this approach 
“PID-based K-anonymity” (with a capital letter K). 
Although this is a reasonable improvement over 
traditional k-anonymity models, further investigation 
reveals that PID-based K-anonymity also does not 
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provide an adequate level of protection against MRPP 
disclosures. For example, the last QI-group in Table 3b 
is considered the most secure group in the dataset using 
PID-based K-anonymity because it contains three 
people, implying a maximum disclosure risk of 1/3; 
but it fails to protect Harry at this security level 
(probability of matching a record in that group to Harry 
is 5/7 = 71%). Such high disclosure risks are caused by 
the unbalanced frequency distribution of the 
individuals in their QI-groups. In the third QI-group, 
both Diana and Edward are protected from privacy 
disclosure with a probability of 2/4 = 0.50. In other 
words, a smaller K may provide better protection than 
a larger K, indicating that the PID-based K parameter 
does not adequately represent the level of protection or 
risk in the unbalanced frequency distribution case in 
the MRPP scenario. 
In short, existing approaches make different 
assumptions and have several limitations when it 
comes to assessing privacy risks in MRPP scenarios. 
Our proposed approach overcomes these limitations 
and effectively extends the single-record-based k-
anonymity and l-diversity approaches to MRPP 
problems. 
4 Disclosure Risk and Data Quality 
Measures 
It is clear that in MRPP scenarios, disclosure risk for 
an individual is closely related to the individual’s 
occurrence frequency. In general, the more unbalanced 
the occurrence distribution of individuals in a QI-
group, the greater the disclosure risk. To limit this risk, 
individuals’ occurrence distribution in QI-groups in 
the released dataset should be well balanced. 
Therefore, the basic idea of our approach for reducing 
individual-record disclosure risk is to create QI-groups 
that contain a sufficient number of individuals with 
relatively balanced occurrence distributions. 
Given the initial dataset D, we can divide D into 
individual-based subsets such that for each individual 
in D, all the records of this individual must be in one 
and only one subset; i.e., two subsets of D cannot 
contain different records of the same individual. All 
subsets mentioned in this paper refer to such 
individual-based subsets; thus, we will omit the term 
“individual-based.” We now define our first proposed 
measure, called g-balance, based on the classical Gini 
index in economics and machine learning (Breiman et 
al., 1984), which we adopt to measure disclosure risk. 
Definition 1 (g-balance): Let t be the dataset D or 
a subset of D and 𝑛𝑡 be the number of individuals 
in t, and 𝑐𝑖 be the number of occurrences of the ith 
individual in t. The g-balance of t is defined as 
 𝑔(𝑡) = 1 − ∑ (
𝑐𝑖
∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝑛𝑡
𝑗=1
)
2𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1
 (1) 
The g-balance measure achieves the maximum when 
individuals in t are evenly distributed, i.e., all 𝑐𝑖’s are 
equal (Breiman et al., 1984). It achieves the minimum 
of zero when t consists of records of a single 
individual, i.e., 𝑛𝑡 = 1  (with any number of 
occurrences of the individual). A larger g value 
indicates a more balanced occurrence distribution in t, 
which suggests better protection against disclosure 
after the QI values are generalized. With this 
observation, we say that a QI-group t satisfies g-
balance requirement for a specified 𝑔∗ value if 𝑔(𝑡) ≥
𝑔∗. The g value is related to the number of individuals 
in a QI-group, as stated in Theorem 1 below. 
Theorem 1: If a QI-group t satisfies the g-balance 
requirement for a specified g value, then the QI-
group has at least 1/(1 − 𝑔) individuals; i.e., 
 𝑛𝑡 ≥
1
1 − 𝑔
 (2) 
The proofs of Theorem 1 and all other mathematical 
results are provided in the Appendix. Based on 
Theorem 1, in forming QI-groups for MRPP problems, 
we can control the number of individuals in a group by 
specifying an appropriate g threshold value. When 
each individual in the group corresponds to a single 
record, there is a direct relationship between the g 
value and the k value in k-anonymity, as stated in 
Corollary 1 below. 
Corollary 1: If a QI-group with k individuals 
satisfies the g-balance requirement and each 
individual in the group corresponds to a single 
record, then 
 𝑘 =
1
1 − 𝑔
 (3) 
It is clear from Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 that the g-
balance measure generalizes the k-anonymity measure. 
Furthermore, it is straightforward to see that Equation 
(3) also holds for PID-based K-anonymity (i.e., when 
k is replaced by K). We note that the balance/skewness 
of the occurrence distribution can be quantified by 
some other statistical dispersion measures such as 
entropy. We chose to use the Gini index because it 
allows us to efficiently derive Theorem 1 and 
Corollary 1. 
Our proposed method uses binary partitioning to split 
the dataset into two smaller subsets recursively to form 
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QI-groups. After the partitioning is completed, the QI 
values in the final subsets are generalized similarly to 
k-anonymity. We denote the parent set for a split by 𝑡𝑝 
and the two child subsets of 𝑡𝑝 by 𝑡1 and 𝑡2. It can be 
shown that the g value before a split is always greater 
than or equal to the weighted average g value after the 
split (Breiman et al., 1984). Such a decrease in g-
balance value implies an increase in disclosure risk. To 
measure this difference, we define g-balance change 
below. 
Definition 2 (g-balance change): Let 𝑔𝑝, 𝑔1 and 
𝑔2  be the g-balance values for 𝑡𝑝 , 𝑡1  and  𝑡2 , 
respectively. Let 𝑐𝑖𝑝 , 𝑐𝑖1 and 𝑐𝑖2 be the number of 
occurrences of the 𝑖𝑝 th individual in 𝑡𝑝 , the 𝑖1 th 
individual in 𝑡1  and the 𝑖2 th individual in 𝑡2 , 
respectively, where ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑝 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖1 + ∑ 𝑐𝑖2 . The g-
balance change from splitting 𝑡𝑝 into 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 is: 
 ∆𝑔(𝑡𝑝) =  𝑔𝑝 −
∑ 𝑐𝑖1
∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑝
−
∑ 𝑐𝑖2
∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑝
𝑔2  (4) 
Next, we consider the sensitive-attribute disclosure 
risk. As discussed in the introduction, the traditional l-
diversity principle is not appropriate for MRPP 
scenarios. Different individuals in a QI-group may 
have very diverse sensitive values. However, because 
each individual may have multiple sensitive values, it 
is possible that a certain sensitive value is shared by 
many or even all the individuals in the group (while the 
other sensitive values may be diversified). If a 
sensitive value is affiliated with all individuals, then 
this value is disclosed with certainty (e.g., Gastritis 
associated with both Diana and Edward in Table 4). In 
general, the larger the proportion of individuals with 
which a sensitive value is affiliated, the higher the 
disclosure risk. Following the convention in data 
privacy literature (Fung et al., 2010; Machanavajjhala 
et al., 2006), we assume all sensitive values are equally 
important. So, the attribute disclosure risk of a QI-
group can be determined by the sensitive value that is 
affiliated with the largest proportion of the individuals 
in the group. 
Definition 3 (h-affiliation): Let t be the dataset D 
or a subset of D, 𝑛𝑡 be the number of individuals in 
t, and 𝑛𝑗 be the number of individuals in t affiliated 
with the jth sensitive value. The h-affiliation of t is 
defined as 
 ℎ(𝑡) = max
𝑗
  
𝑛𝑗
𝑛𝑡  
 (5) 
The h-affiliation measure achieves the maximum of 
one when all individuals in t are affiliated with a 
common sensitive value. It achieves the minimum of 
1/𝑛𝑡  when no individuals in t share any common 
sensitive value. Clearly, a larger h value suggests a 
higher sensitive-attribute disclosure risk. With this 
observation, we say that a QI-group t satisfies h-
affiliation requirement for a specified ℎ∗  value if 
ℎ(𝑡) ≤ ℎ∗. 
A common yet conservative interpretation of the “l 
well-represented values” in l-diversity is that the 
relative frequency of the most frequent sensitive value 
in a QI-group cannot be greater than 1/𝑙 
(Machanavajjhala et al., 2006; Xiao & Tao, 2006). 
This l-diversity requirement can be specified as 
max (𝑘𝑗)/𝑘 ≤ 1/𝑙, where 𝑘𝑗 is the number of records 
in the QI-group having the jth sensitive value, and k is 
the total number of records in the QI-group. When each 
individual corresponds to a single record only, it is 
easy to see that 𝑛𝑗 = 𝑘𝑗, ∀𝑗 , and so max(𝑛𝑗) =
max(𝑘𝑗).  Then, the h-affiliation requirement is 
equivalent to the l-diversity requirement and the ℎ∗ 
value is simply the reciprocal of the l value: 
 ℎ∗ =
1
𝑙
 (6) 
So, the h-affiliation measure generalizes the l-diversity 
measure. The h-affiliation has the following property 
related to data partitioning. 
Lemma 1. When a dataset is partitioned into 
subsets, the h-affiliation for at least one subset will 
be greater than or equal to the h-affiliation of the 
dataset before the partitioning. 
Lemma 1 suggests that splitting data into subsets 
generally increases the attribute disclosure risk. We 
mentioned earlier that splitting data also increases the 
individual-record disclosure risk because of a change 
in g-balance value. These properties provide a 
theoretical basis for our proposed recursive 
partitioning algorithm in assessing both disclosure 
risks. 
Our method keeps track of the number of individuals 
affiliated with each sensitive value in the group. Figure 
2 shows the partitioning process for the dataset in 
Table 3. Figure 2a (𝑡𝑝 = 𝐷) shows the dataset D in 
Table 3a. The final QI-groups include Figure 2b (𝑡1), 
Figure 2d (𝑡21) and Figure 2e (𝑡22), all having a well-
balanced frequency distribution of the individuals. 
Within each group (subset), no disease is affiliated 
with more than 50% of the patients. We describe how 
to compute 𝑔 and h values here and will explain how 
the splits are determined in the next section. 
First, the g-balance of D given in Figure 2a (i.e., 𝑡𝑝) is 
computed by substituting the 𝑐𝑖 values from the table 
into Equation (1) as follows: 
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𝑔(𝑡𝑝) = 1 − (
2
19
)
2
− (
1
19
)
2
− (
5
19
)
2
− (
2
19
)
2
− (
2
19
)
2
− (
1
19
)
2
− (
1
19
)
2
− (
5
19
)
2
= 0.82 . 
For example, the first 2/19 applies to the first 
individual Ashley, whose number of occurrences (𝑐1) 
is 2, and the total number of occurrences of all 
individuals is ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑗 = 19 . The h-affiliation of 𝑡𝑝  is 
computed by substituting 𝑛𝑗 values into Equation (5) 
as below: 
ℎ = max (
2
8
,
1
8
,
3
8
,
3
8
,
2
8
,
3
8
 ) = 0.375, 
where each number inside the parentheses is the 
fraction of individuals affiliated with each of the six 
diseases in the table. For example, 
2
8
 represents that 2 
out of 8 patients have Asthma. When 𝑡𝑝 is split into 𝑡1 
(Figure 2b) and 𝑡2  (Figure 2c) based on gender, g 
values for 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 are respectively 0.5 and 0.747; h 
values are both 0.5. Then, the g-balance change by 
splitting 𝑡𝑝 into 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 is computed using Equation 
(4): 
∆𝑔(𝑡𝑝) =  0.82 − (
4
19
)0.5 − (
15
19
)0.747 = 0.1252. 
Similarly, if the dataset is split based on the median of 
Age or ZIP, the corresponding ∆𝑔 value will be 0.1707 
or 0.1802, respectively. 
Our recursive partitioning method adopts the idea of 
the well-known kd-tree technique (Friedman, Bentley, 
& Finkel, 1977), where each split is determined based 
on the variance of the QI attributes. Typically, the QI 
attribute with the largest variance at each iteration is 
used to split the data, as this will result in the most 
significant reduction in variance in the partitioned data. 
A lower variance in a QI-group leads to a better data 
utility because it causes a smaller information loss (i.e., 
loss in variation) after QI values within the partitioned 
group are generalized. In other words, with a smaller 
within-group variance, the generalized values will be 
closer to the original values. Thus, we use variance to 
measure the quality of anonymized data. Variance is 
calculated by considering multiple records per person 
since the released dataset will be in multiple record per 
person format. 
 
 
Figure 2. Data Partitioning Process for Dataset in Table 3a 
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In calculating variance, we transform categorical QI 
values into numeric or ordered values based on coding 
methods suggested in LeFevre, DeWitt, and 
Ramakrishnan (2006), and normalize all numeric 
values (original or transformed) to the unit scale of 
range [0, 1]. For example, for gender, we assign zero 
for female and one for male. If the QI attribute has 
more than two unordered categories, additional binary 
attributes are created to handle multiple categories one 
by one. 
5 The Proposed Algorithm 
There are two objectives in our partitioning process for 
anonymizing data: (1) to minimize disclosure risks, 
which means keeping change in g-balance and increase 
in h-affiliation as small as possible, and (2) to 
minimize information loss after generalization by 
reducing the variance of the partitioned data as much 
as possible before generalization. We note again that 
g-balance is used to achieve a more balanced 
frequency distribution in QI-groups, while h-affiliation 
is used to ensure that no sensitive values occur too 
frequently in any given QI-group. 
We indicated that the g value will decrease during the 
data partitioning process and proposed using the ∆𝑔 
measure to quantify this change in g value. While 
Lemma 1 suggests that h-affiliation generally increases 
with data partitioning, it is difficult to construct a 
composite measure to quantify the changes in both g-
balance and h-affiliation simultaneously. Therefore, 
our strategy is to first use g-balance to determine how 
to split the data and then use h-affiliation as a 
constraint to check whether the partitioned QI-groups 
satisfy the sensitive attribute protection requirement. 
This idea of handling two different disclosure risk 
criteria in computation is similar to that of 
Machanavajjhala et al. (2006), where the l-diversity 
requirement is checked after a group is formed based 
on a k-anonymity algorithm. The QI values of all 
individuals are generalized after the entire partitioning 
process is completed. 
On the other hand, there is a nice way to integrate g-
balance (as a disclosure risk measure) and variance (as 
an information loss measure) into a single combined 
measure. It is clear that a split with a small g-balance 
change ∆𝑔(𝑡)  is preferred since it implies a small 
increase in disclosure risk after splitting the data. In 
terms of information loss, it is preferred that the 
generalized value for each QI-group is as close to the 
original individual values as possible. In other words, 
the variance in a group after data partitioning should 
be as small as possible. Therefore, the attribute with 
the largest variance should be used to split the data so 
that the partitioned groups will have their within-group 
variance reduced most significantly. We define a g-
balance/variance ratio measure below to represent this 
trade-off between disclosure protection and data 
quality. It is used as the splitting criterion in the data 
partitioning process. 
Definition 4 (balance-variance ratio): Let t be the 
dataset D or a subset of D and 𝑣𝑗(𝑡) be the variance 
of the jth QI attribute in t. The balance-variance ratio 
for splitting t on the 𝑗th QI attribute is defined as 
 𝑟𝑗(𝑡) =
∆𝑔(𝑡)
𝑣𝑗(𝑡)
 (7) 
The balance-variance ratio represents the marginal 
decrease in g-balance per unit variance of a QI 
attribute. Because a small g-balance change and a large 
variance are preferred for a candidate split, the QI 
attribute that has the minimum balance-variance ratio 
should be selected for partitioning the data at each 
iteration. The proposed algorithm recursively splits 
data into two subsets at the median of the QI attribute 
having the minimum balance-variance ratio. If the QI 
attribute is of the ordered categorical type, the split is 
made at the between-category point closest to the 
median among all between-category points. 
Table 5 describes the steps of the proposed algorithm, 
where two user-specified privacy requirement 
parameters are used: minimum g-balance value, g*, 
and maximum h-affiliation value, h*. The 
computational time complexity of the algorithm is 
equivalent to that of a kd-tree, which is of 𝑂(𝑁 log 𝑁) 
for a dataset of N records (Friedman et al., 1977). This 
is very efficient for handling large datasets. 
 
Table 5. The Proposed Algorithm 
 Input: Dataset D, threshold values g* and h*. 
Step 1 For the current dataset t, compute 𝑟𝑗(𝑡) for each QI attribute j. Let j* be the QI with minimum 𝑟𝑗(𝑡). 
Step 2 
(i)  Split t into two subsets at the median of attribute j*. 
(ii) If the g-balance value of any subset of t is smaller than g* or h-affiliation value of any subset of t is greater than 
h*, undo split and set j* to the QI attribute with the next smallest  𝑟𝑗(𝑡) and go to (i). Stop splitting if no QI attribute 
can be assigned to j*. 
Step 3 Repeat Steps 1 and 2 for each subset until no further split can be made. 
Step 4 Generalize the QI values in each subset. 
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Continuing with the illustrative example in Figure 2a, 
suppose 𝑔∗ = 0.5 and ℎ∗ = 0.5. For gender, we thus 
have 𝑣2 = 0.1662  and 𝑟2 = ∆𝑔/𝑣2 = 0.1252/
0.1662 = 0.753.  Similarly, for age, 𝑣1 = 0.1202 
(with normalized values) and 𝑟1 = 0.1707/0.1202 =
1.420 ; and for ZIP, 𝑣3 = 0.1959  and 𝑟3 = 0.1802/
0.1959 = 0.920. So, the second QI attribute, gender, 
is selected for the first split since 𝑟2 is the smallest. The 
two subsets are shown in Figure 2b (𝑡1) and Figure 2c 
(𝑡2). Subsequently, Figure 2c (𝑡2) can be further split 
into Figure 2d (𝑡21) and Figure 2e (𝑡22) based on the 
first QI attribute age. Figure 2b (𝑡1), Figure 2d (𝑡21), 
and Figure 2e ( 𝑡22 ), cannot be split further since 
splitting any of these tables causes a 𝑔  value to be 
smaller than 0.5 and/or an ℎ value to be greater than 
0.5 for at least one of the child subsets. 
The QI-groups of the anonymized dataset using the 
proposed algorithm is shown in Table 6b. For 
illustration, we also provide Table 6a, which is the 
same as Table 3a except that records are reordered to 
match the records in the anonymized dataset. It can be 
seen that the anonymized dataset has multiple 
individuals in each QI-group with well-balanced 
frequency distributions and no disease occurs too 
frequently relative to the number of individuals in each 
QI-group. The g and h values in each QI-group all 
satisfy the threshold requirements; i.e., 𝑔 ≥ 𝑔∗ = 0.5 
and ℎ ≤ ℎ∗ = 0.5  (in the first group, 𝑔 = 0.5, ℎ =
0.5; in the second group, 𝑔 = 0.5, ℎ = 0.5; and in the 
third group, 𝑔 = 0.72, ℎ = 0.5). 
 
Table 6. The Original and Anonymized Datasets (g* = 0.50; h* = 0.50) 
a. Original dataset  b. Anonymized dataset 
Name Age Gender ZIP Disease  PID Age Gender ZIP Disease 
Ashley 86 Female 20375 Asthma  A 84-86 Female 20090-20375 Asthma 
Ashley 86 Female 20375 Reflux  A 84-86 Female 20090-20375 Reflux 
Diana 84 Female 20090 Ulcer  D 84-86 Female 20090-20375 Ulcer 
Diana 84 Female 20090 Gastritis  D 84-86 Female 20090-20375 Gastritis 
Bob 85 Male 20375 Reflux  B 78-85 Male 20090-20420 Reflux 
Edward 84 Male 20090 Pneumonia  E 78-85 Male 20090-20420 Pneumonia 
Edward 84 Male 20090 Gastritis  E 78-85 Male 20090-20420 Gastritis 
Fred 78 Male 20400 Pneumonia  F 78-85 Male 20090-20420 Pneumonia 
Greg 78 Male 20420 Ulcer  G 78-85 Male 
 
 
20090-20420 Ulcer 
Charlie 69 Male 20048 Pneumonia  C 69-76 Male 20048-20400 Pneumonia 
Charlie 70 Male 20048 Pneumonia  C 69-76 Male 20048-20400 Pneumonia 
Charlie 71 Male 20048 Pneumonia  C 69-76 Male 20048-20400 Pneumonia 
Charlie 71 Male 20048 Gastritis  C 69-76 Male 20048-20400 Gastritis 
Charlie 71 Male 20048 Gastritis  C 69-76 Male 20048-20400 Gastritis 
Harry 74 Male 20400 Asthma  H 69-76 Male 20048-20400 Asthma 
Harry 75 Male 20400 Bronchitis  H 69-76 Male 20048-20400 Bronchitis 
Harry 76 Male 20400 Asthma  H 69-76 Male 20048-20400 Asthma 
Harry 74 Male 20400 Ulcer  H 69-76 Male 20048-20400 Ulcer 
Harry 76 Male 20400 Ulcer  H 69-76 Male 20048-20400 Ulcer 
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6 Experimental Evaluation 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed method, 
we conducted an experimental evaluation study using 
three real-world databases. The first is a healthcare 
database provided by the INFORMS Data Mining 
Section (2008) for its first data mining contest. The 
database consists of four related datasets, two of which 
are closely related to MRPP problems: patient 
demographics and patient conditions. The patient 
demographics dataset includes attributes such as 
patient ID, year of birth, gender, race, years of 
education, marital status, income, and poverty level. 
The patient conditions dataset includes attributes such 
as patient ID, ICD-9 diagnosis code, and year. The two 
datasets were joined into one set according to patient 
ID. From the patient demographics dataset, we chose 
year of birth, years of education, income, and poverty 
level for the QI attributes; from the patient conditions 
set, we chose ICD-9 diagnosis code as the sensitive 
attribute. We obtained count values based on patient 
ID in the patient conditions dataset. After removing 
records with missing information, 117,307 medical 
condition records for 29,531 patients remained. 
Approximately 25,000 patients out of 29,531 had 
multiple visits. 
The second database contains movie rating data 
collected by Harper and Konstan (2016). This dataset 
is somewhat similar to the Netflix dataset discussed in 
the introduction, but the Netflix dataset is no longer 
available. The database consists of three related 
datasets, two of which are closely related to MRPP 
problems: user and rating datasets. The user dataset 
provides demographic information for 943 users, 
including user ID, age, gender, occupation, and ZIP 
code. We selected age, gender, and ZIP code for the QI 
attributes. The rating dataset contains 100,000 user 
ratings (1-5 scale) for 1,682 movies, with attributes of 
user ID, movie ID, rating, and a time stamp. Initially, 
we considered using movie ID as the sensitive 
attribute. However, it turned out that some popular 
movies were very common to a large number of users, 
making it difficult to consider it sensitive. In order to 
make sensitive attribute values more meaningful, we 
considered the attributes movie ID, rating, and 
month/year together as the sensitive attribute; that is, 
we combined the values of the attributes of movie ID, 
rating, and month/year to create the sensitive attribute 
value. Again, the user and rating datasets were joined 
into one set according to user ID. 
The third database contains financial data from a bank 
about their clients, accounts, and transactions (PKDD, 
1999). The database consists of eight related datasets, 
four of which are closely related to MRPP problems: 
client, account, demographics, and transactions. The 
four datasets were joined into one set using client ID 
and account ID. We chose date of birth, salary level, 
and account open date as the QI attributes. We defined 
the sensitive attribute as the transaction amount per 
period, which was rounded to the nearest hundred 
dollars. After removing records with missing values, 
the aggregated dataset contained 273,508 transaction 
records from 3,674 clients. 
7 Evaluation of Individual-
Recorded Disclosure Risk 
We first compared our g-balance based method with k-
anonymity and PID-based K-anonymity in terms of 
individual-record disclosure risk and data quality for the 
MRPP scenario. As discussed above, the individual-
record disclosure risk (IDR) of the 𝑖th person in a QI-
group of size k can be defined by 𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖/ ∑ 𝑓𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 , 
where 𝑓𝑖 is the number of records associated with the 𝑖th 
person in the QI-group. In general, individuals in a QI-
group may have different IDR values. In data privacy 
research and practice, it is a common practice to 
measure disclosure risk based on the maximum risk 
instead of average risk (Sweeney, 2002; Fung et al., 
2010; Xiao & Tao, 2006). So, we defined the individual-
record disclosure risk of a QI-group q as the maximum 
IDR value in the group, written as 𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑞 =
max(𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑖) . To evaluate individual-record disclosure 
risk for an anonymized dataset with m QI-groups, we 
use the maximum and average GIDR measures, defined 
below: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅 = max
𝑞=1,…,𝑚
𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑞 
 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅 =
1
𝑚
∑ 𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑞
𝑚
𝑞=1
 
 
We ran a k-anonymity algorithm (LeFevre et al., 2006) 
using seven different k values: 𝑘 =
2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20, 50 , and also used the same seven 
values for PID-based K-anonymity, 𝐾 =
2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20, 50 . Based on Equation (3), which 
provides a direct relationship between the k (or K) and 
g values in the one record per person case scenario, we 
then selected seven corresponding g values: 𝑔 = 0.50,
0.67, 0.80, 0.86, 0.90, 0.95, 0.98. Some individuals in 
the dataset had only one record per person and it is 
possible that these individuals were assigned to the 
same QI-group. So, the selection of corresponding g 
values ensures that the dataset anonymized with the g-
balance based method satisfies respective k-anonymity 
and PID-based K-anonymity requirements in this 
situation. Tables 7, 8, and 9 show the maximum and 
average individual-record disclosure risks for the three 
datasets anonymized based on the chosen k, K, and g 
values, respectively. 
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Table 7. Comparison of Individual-Record Disclosure Risks in Patient Data 
a. Risk with k-anonymity  b.  Risk with PID-based K-anonymity  c. Risk with g-balance 
k 
MaxGIDR 
(%) 
AvgGIDR 
(%) 
 K 
MaxGIDR 
(%) 
AvgGIDR 
(%) 
 G 
MaxGIDR 
(%) 
AvgGIDR 
(%) 
2 100.00 88.55  2 96.67 59.26  0.50 68.18 44.11 
3 100.00 82.07  3 94.29 46.48  0.67 54.17 33.52 
5 100.00 70.63  5 77.14 34.09  0.80 40.00 23.54 
7 100.00 62.57  7 76.74 27.40  0.86 33.33 18.33 
10 100.00 53.28  10 59.02 21.56  0.90 25.58 14.16 
20 100.00 36.63  20 45.59 13.62  0.95 16.45 8.55 
50 76.67 20.75  50 17.46 7.03  0.98 7.33 4.25 
Table 8. Comparison of Individual-Record Disclosure Risks in Movie Data 
a. Risk with k-anonymity  b. Risk with PID-based K-anonymity  c. Risk with g-balance 
k 
MaxGIDR 
 (%) 
AvgGIDR 
(%) 
 K 
MaxGIDR 
(%) 
AvgGIDR 
(%) 
 
G 
MaxGIDR 
(%) 
AvgGIDR 
(%) 
2 100.00 99.27  2 96.07 63.00  0.50 67.37 45.39 
3 100.00 99.27  3 90.21 50.07  0.67 53.89 34.67 
5 100.00 99.27  5 81.35 35.37  0.80 35.46 24.01 
7 100.00 99.27  7 81.02 28.65  0.86 30.16 18.83 
10 100.00 99.27  10 50.74 21.87  0.90 23.54 13.18 
20 100.00 99.27  20 35.90 13.33  0.95 11.98 7.65 
50 100.00 85.94  50 9.87 6.96  0.98 5.88 4.41 
 
Table 9. Comparison of Individual-Record Disclosure Risks in Bank Data  
a. Risk with k-anonymity  b. Risk with PID-based K-anonymity  c. Risk with g-balance 
k 
MaxGIDR 
 (%) 
AvgGIDR 
(%) 
 K 
MaxGIDR 
(%) 
AvgGIDR 
(%) 
 
g 
MaxGIDR 
(%) 
AvgGIDR 
(%) 
2 100.00 99.84  2 98.14 57.11  0.50 66.49 40.04 
3 100.00 99.84  3 82.58 41.36  0.67 51.06 30.65 
5 100.00 99.82  5 56.61 28.07  0.80 34.24 21.03 
7 100.00 99.77  7 41.64 20.52  0.86 25.69 15.19 
10 100.00 99.47  10 33.43 16.01  0.90 19.10 11.92 
20 100.00 97.59  20 17.19 8.58  0.95 10.30 6.39 
50 100.00 87.99  50 6.08 3.98  0.98 5.12 3.09 
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It can be observed that k-anonymity is very ineffective 
against MRPP disclosure. In Tables 7a, 8a, and 9a, the 
maximum disclosure risks are 100% for k = 2 through 
20, meaning that some QI-groups consist of multiple 
records of only one individual, which can be uniquely 
reidentified. Even with k = 50, the maximum risks are 
still very high (76.67%, 100%, and 100% for the 
patient, movie, and bank data, respectively). While 
PID-based K-anonymity does a better job than k-
anonymity, the g-balance based method clearly 
outperforms both k-anonymity and PID-based K-
anonymity in every comparison category. The 
individual-record disclosure risks using g-balance are 
significantly lower than those using the other two 
methods in every risk assessment scenario. This is 
because of the balanced frequency distribution of 
individuals within a QI-group in the proposed method, 
which is designed to limit the disclosure risk of 
individuals’ records with multiple occurrences. In 
addition, because of the direct relationship between the 
k (or K) and g values when each individual in a QI-
group has only one record, the dataset anonymized 
with the g-balance based method satisfies 
corresponding k-anonymity and PID-based K-
anonymity requirements in the one record per person 
case scenario. 
Next, we evaluate data quality by measuring 
information loss because of generalization. Let D be 
the original dataset with N individuals and d QI 
attributes, and D* be the anonymized version of D, 
where its QI values are generalized using the means of 
the QI attributes in each QI-group. Let 𝑥𝑖𝑗  and 𝑥𝑖𝑗
∗  be 
the normalized values of the 𝑗th QI attribute of the 𝑖th 
individual in D and D*, respectively. Information loss 
because of generalization can be measured using the 
average normalized error (ANE), computed by 
 
𝐴𝑁𝐸 =
1
𝑑 ∗ 𝑁
∑ ∑|𝑥𝑖𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖𝑗
∗ |
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑑
𝑗=1
 
 
ANE measures the average normalized distances 
between the original and generalized QI values. A 
small ANE suggests a small information loss and thus 
is desirable for higher data quality. In order to compare 
the ANEs between the two methods, it is necessary to 
“control” the disclosure risk at the same level for all 
methods. Thus, we gradually adjusted the k and K 
values in k- and K-anonymity and g values in g-balance 
such that the resulting MaxGIDR values are 
comparable at six target levels: 1%, 2%, 5%, 10%, 
15%, and 20% for the patient data (in data privacy 
research and practice, disclosure risk is more often 
measured using the maximum risk instead of average 
risk). For the movie and bank datasets, because some 
individuals had a very high number of occurrences, it 
was not possible to get the target levels of 1% and 2% 
for MaxGIDR. So, we set five target levels: 5%, 10%, 
15%, 20% and 25%. To be conservative, we made the 
MaxGIDR value from g-balance slightly smaller than 
that from k-anonymity at each level. We can then 
compare the related ANE values. 
The results of this experiment are given in Tables 10, 
11, and 12. The ANE values with g-balance are 
considerably smaller than those with k- and K-
anonymity at all levels while the MaxGIDR values 
with g-balance are about the same as (or slightly 
smaller than) those with k- and K-anonymity at all 
levels. This suggests that the g-balance based method 
results in smaller information loss than k- and K-
anonymity, given about the same individual-record 
disclosure risk. One explanation is that k- and K-
anonymity reduce the risk only by increasing the group 
size, which directly causes information loss when the 
QI values within a group are generalized. The g-
balance method focuses on the occurrences of each 
individual and assigns individuals with similar 
occurrence frequencies into the same group, which 
does not necessarily require increasing the group size. 
A second explanation is that our proposed algorithm 
partitions data into QI-group using the balance-
variance ratio, which can achieve a superior tradeoff 
between disclosure risk and information loss. In 
summary, the results from Tables 7 through 12 indicate 
that the proposed g-balance method outperforms k- and 
K-anonymity in terms of both privacy protection and 
data quality.
 
Table 10. Comparison of Information Loss Given Individual-Record Disclosure Risks in Patient Data 
Target MaxGIDR (%) 
k-Anonymity PID-based K-anonymity g-Balance 
MaxGIDR (%) ANE MaxGIDR (%) ANE MaxGIDR (%) ANE 
20 19.41 1.479 19.19 1.118 18.79 0.469 
15 16.64 2.951 16.27 1.814 14.45 0.923 
10 9.60 4.031 9.14 3.160 9.03 2.477 
5 5.36 10.505 4.64 9.229 4.49 8.962 
2 2.44 34.815 2.48 34.571 2.43 22.789 
1 1.43 81.068 1.93 78.809 1.35 55.298 
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Table 11. Comparison of Information Loss Given Individual-Record Disclosure Risks in Movie Data 
Target MaxGIDR (%) 
k-Anonymity PID-based K-anonymity g-Balance 
MaxGIDR (%) ANE MaxGIDR (%) ANE MaxGIDR (%) ANE 
25 25.58 0.908 26.97 0.902 25.00 0.506 
20 20.87 1.022 21.38 0.984 20.40 0.867 
15 15.23 2.133 15.78 2.107 14.57 1.723 
10 12.07 2.785 12.01 2.918 11.98 2.205 
5 5.92 8.551 6.02 8.976 5.88 7.825 
 
Table 12. Comparison of Information Loss Given Individual-Record Disclosure Risks in Bank Data 
Target MaxGIDR (%) 
k-Anonymity PID-based K-Anonymity g-Balance 
MaxGIDR (%) ANE MaxGIDR (%) ANE MaxGIDR (%) ANE 
25 24.85 1.263 23.55 0.610 23.53 0.498 
20 22.05 1.341 21.64 0.806 21.39 0.557 
15 15.93 1.811 14.42 1.431 14.38 0.947 
10 10.64 3.298 10.85 2.804 10.30 1.786 
5 5.55 8.230 5.68 7.781 5.48 4.608 
8 Evaluation of Sensitive-Attribute 
Disclosure Risk 
We now compare h-affiliation with l-diversity in the 
effectiveness of measuring sensitive-attribute 
disclosure risk. While QI values are generalized to 
satisfy k-anonymity or g-balance requirements, we 
note that sensitive attributes are usually not subject to 
change in most data privacy approaches (DHHS, 2000; 
Fung et al., 2010). Indeed, l-diversity and h-affiliation 
mitigate sensitive-attribute disclosure risk by forming 
the QI-groups and adjusting the group sizes to include 
diverse sensitive values rather than changing the 
sensitive values. 
As discussed earlier, sensitive-attribute disclosure risk 
(SAR) in a QI-group depends on how many individuals 
in the group are associated with a sensitive value. For 
a QI-group of size k, SAR for the jth sensitive value can 
be defined by 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑗 = 𝑛𝑗/𝑘, where 𝑛𝑗 is the number of 
people having the jth sensitive value in the QI-group. 
Furthermore, we define the sensitive-attribute 
disclosure risk of a QI-group q to be the maximum SAR 
among all sensitive values, written as 𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑞 = 
max(𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑗). To evaluate sensitive-attribute disclosure 
risk for an anonymized dataset with m QI-groups, we 
use the maximum and average GSAR measures, 
defined below: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑅 = max
𝑞=1,…,𝑚
𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑞 
 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑅 =
1
𝑚
∑ 𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑞
𝑚
𝑞=1
 
 
The results of the previous section show  that g-balance 
is more effective than both traditional k-anonymity and 
PID-based K-anonymity in reducing disclosure risk 
and information loss. Therefore, we compared h-
affiliation with l-diversity based on the QI-groups 
formed using g-balance. We set three g-balance 
threshold levels, 𝑔∗ = 0.50, 0.67 and 0.80  for the 
experiment. For each g level, we applied several 
threshold values for l-diversity and h-affiliation to 
examine the maximum and average sensitive-attribute 
disclosure risks.  
We ran our algorithm with l-diversity measure using 
five different l values: 𝑙 = 2, 3, 5, 10, 20 . Based on 
Equation (6), we have ℎ = 1/𝑙 in the one-record-per-
person case. So, we selected five corresponding h 
values: ℎ = 0.50, 0.33, 0.20, 0.10, 0.05. Tables 13, 
14, and 15 show the maximum and average sensitive- 
attribute disclosure risks for the two datasets 
anonymized based on those l and h values. 
It can be observed that l-diversity is very ineffective in 
controlling sensitive-attribute disclosure risk in the 
MRPP problem. For example, with the patient data 
when 𝑔∗ = 0.5, the MaxGSAR values are 100% for l = 
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2 through 10, which means that in some QI-groups all 
individuals have a common sensitive value, causing 
the sensitive value to be disclosed with certainty. As l-
diversity increases, disclosure risk generally decreases. 
However, there is not an intuitive connection between 
l values and actual risk levels. We note that for the 
movie dataset, MaxGSAR and AvgGSAR values with l-
diversity do not change when l values are increased 
from 2 through 20. This is because in the original 
dataset each individual has at least 20 occurrences 
(lower frequency individuals were removed from the 
original data to balance the frequency distributions). It 
is practically impossible to tell, based on the results of 
either dataset, what risk a QI-group has for a given l-
diversity value. On the other hand, it is clear that h-
affiliation is more effective in controlling sensitive- 
attribute disclosure risk in MRPP problems. For 
example, when 𝑔∗ = 0.5, the MaxGSAR values in the 
patient data decreases from 50% to around 4.4% for h 
= 0.50 through 0.05. Similarly, in the movie and bank 
cases for the same 𝑔∗  and h values, MaxGSAR 
decreases from 50% to 4.8% and 6.21%, respectively. 
Clearly, h value closely represents the actual maximum 
sensitive-attribute disclosure risk in the MRPP 
problem and is more effective in controlling the risk 
than l-diversity. Also, it can be seen that as the h-
affiliation value gets smaller, it performs much better 
than the corresponding l-diversity measure. In 
summary, for each corresponding l and h value at each 
of the three 𝑔∗  levels, h-affiliation results in 
substantially lower maximum and average sensitive-
attribute disclosure risks than l-diversity. 
For h-affiliation in the patient and bank data (Tables 13 
and 15), the MaxGSAR values with the same h value 
are the same for all three different g threshold values. 
This is because the groups formed by the proposed 
algorithm are constrained by the h threshold values, 
instead of the g threshold values. For the movie data 
(Table 14), some of the MaxGSAR values with h-
affiliation for 𝑔∗ = 0.8  are different from the 
corresponding MaxGSAR values for 𝑔∗ = 0.5  (and 
𝑔∗ = 0.67 ). For example, when 𝑔∗ = 0.8  and ℎ =
0.5, 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑅 = 30%, whereas when 𝑔∗ = 0.5 and 
ℎ = 0.5 , 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑅 = 50% . This is because the 
groups formed by the proposed algorithm are 
constrained by 𝑔∗ = 0.8 and 𝑔∗ = 0.5 (instead of ℎ =
0.5), respectively. 
 
Table 13. Comparison of Sensitive-Attribute Disclosure Risk in Patient Data 
Threshold 
g* 
l-Diversity h-Affiliation 
l MaxGSAR (%) AvgGSAR (%) h MaxGSAR (%) AvgGSAR (%) 
0.50 
2 100.00 35.39 0.50 50.00 32.26 
3 100.00 33.70 0.33 31.58 20.91 
5 100.00 31.24 0.20 20.00 15.35 
10 100.00 22.85 0.10 10.00 8.26 
20 27.78 12.78 0.05 4.39 3.88 
0.67 
2 80.00 27.01 0.50 50.00 25.38 
3 80.00 26.83 0.33 31.58 20.58 
5 80.00 26.23 0.20 20.00 15.31 
10 80.00 21.49 0.10 10.00 8.25 
20 27.78 12.83 0.05 4.39 3.88 
0.80 
  2 62.50 20.88 0.50 50.00 20.84 
  3 62.50 20.86 0.33 31.58 19.13 
  5 55.56 20.75 0.20 20.00 14.91 
10 55.56 19.08 0.10 10.00 8.29 
20 27.78 12.83 0.05 4.39 3.88 
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Table 14. Comparison of Sensitive-Attribute Disclosure Risk in Movie Data 
Threshold 
g* 
l-Diversity h-Affiliation 
l MaxGSAR (%) AvgGSAR (%) h MaxGSAR (%) AvgGSAR (%) 
0.50 
2 66.67 27.40 0.50 50.00 26.96 
3 66.67 27.40 0.33 28.57 18.68 
5 66.67 27.40 0.20 20.00 15.01 
10 66.67 27.40 0.10 10.00 7.28 
20 66.67 27.40 0.05 4.84 3.82 
0.67 
2 50.00 19.70 0.50 50.00 19.70 
3 50.00 19.70 0.33 28.57 18.15 
5 50.00 19.70 0.20 20.00 14.91 
10 50.00 19.70 0.10 10.00 7.28 
20 50.00 19.70 0.05 4.84 3.82 
0.80 
2 30.00 13.95 0.50 30.00 13.95 
3 30.00 13.95 0.33 30.00 13.95 
5 30.00 13.95 0.20 20.00 12.96 
10 30.00 13.95 0.10 10.00 7.28 
20 30.00 13.95 0.05 4.84 3.82 
Next, we evaluate the performance of h-affiliation in 
terms of data quality. We again first used g-balance to 
form the QI-groups with three thresholds, 𝑔∗ =
0.50, 0.67 and 0.80. We then applied l-diversity and 
h-affiliation for anonymizing data and compare their 
data quality by measuring information loss because of 
generalization. While identity disclosure reveals both 
the identity and sensitive values of an individual, 
attribute disclosure does not necessarily lead to the 
unique identification of an individual. So, the 
minimum threshold values used for attribute disclosure 
risk are usually larger than those for identity disclosure 
(Duncan & Lambert, 1989; Machanavajjhala et al., 
2006; Fung et al., 2010). For each g level, we 
compared the ANE values of both methods by 
controlling the maximum sensitive-attribute disclosure 
risk (MaxGSAR) at three target levels: 10%, 15%, and 
20%. To be conservative, we kept the MaxGSAR 
values from h-affiliation slightly smaller than those 
from l-diversity and then compared the corresponding 
ANE values. 
The results of this experiment are given in Tables 16, 
17, and 18. The ANE values with h-affiliation are 
substantially smaller than those with l-diversity at all 
levels while the MaxGSAR values with h-affiliation are 
about the same as (or slightly smaller than) those with 
l-diversity at all levels. This suggests that the h-
affiliation results in smaller information loss than l-
diversity, given the same sensitive-attribute disclosure 
risk. In the patient data, some diseases are very 
common across all individuals, as well as for those 
within a QI-group. l-Diversity does not have a built-in 
mechanism to deal with this problem when a patient 
has multiple records with multiple diseases. It relies 
solely on increasing the group size to satisfy a target 
MaxGSAR level, which results in much larger group 
sizes than those with h-affiliation. This issue is not so 
significant for the movie and bank data because no 
sensitive values are common across a large number of 
individuals. Because of this different characteristic in 
the data, the differences in ANE values between l-
diversity and h-affiliation in the patient data are 
substantially larger than those in the movie and bank 
data. 
In summary, the findings from Tables 13 through 18 
indicate that the proposed h-affiliation method 
provides a more intuitive representation of sensitive- 
attribute disclosure risk, and it outperforms l-diversity 
in terms of both privacy protection and data quality in 
data with multiple records per person.
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Table 15. Comparison of Sensitive-Attribute Disclosure Risk in Bank Data 
Threshold 
g* 
l-Diversity h-Affiliation 
l MaxGSAR (%) AvgGSAR (%) h MaxGSAR (%) AvgGSAR (%) 
0.50 
2 100.00 34.19 0.50 50.00 31.59 
3 75.00 33.05 0.33 30.77 21.20 
5 66.67 26.21 0.20 20.00 15.37 
10 27.38 14.49 0.10 10.00 7.92 
20 20.00 10.08 0.05 6.21 6.21 
0.67 
2 75.00 27.94 0.50 50.00 27.62 
3 75.00 27.78 0.33 30.77 21.20 
5 50.00 25.72 0.20 20.00 15.42 
10 40.00 17.19 0.10 10.00 8.63 
20 20.00 10.08 0.05 6.21 6.21 
0.80 
2 57.14 22.21 0.50 50.00 22.13 
3 57.14 22.21 0.33 30.77 19.99 
5 50.00 21.75 0.20 20.00 15.42 
10 33.33 16.86 0.10 10.00 8.63 
20 20.00 10.08 0.05 6.21 6.21 
 
Table 16. Comparison of Information Loss Given Attribute Disclosure Risks in Patient Data 
Threshold 
g* 
Target  
MaxGSAR (%) 
l-Diversity h-Affiliation 
MaxGSAR (%) ANE  MaxGSAR (%) ANE 
0.50 
20 20.12 14.989 18.37 0.404 
15 15.96 27.249 14.29 1.536 
10 10.80 259.512 9.47 28.317 
0.67 
20 20.10 15.012 18.08 0.435 
15 14.67 31.880 13.99 1.752 
10 10.43 309.400 9.21 82.312 
0.80 
20 20.10 16.295 17.97 0.575 
15 14.81 28.871 14.29 1.550 
10 8.92 467.803 8.89 139.537 
 
Table 17. Comparison of Information Loss Given Attribute Disclosure Risks in Movie Data 
Threshold 
g* 
Target  
MaxGSAR (%) 
l-Diversity h-Affiliation 
MaxGSAR (%) ANE  MaxGSAR (%) ANE 
0.50 
20 20.00 0.383 19.29 0.198 
15 15.34 0.899 14.29 0.404 
10 10.59 1.959 10.00 0.789 
0.67 
20 21.11 0.354 20.00 0.176 
15 14.63 0.900 14.56 0.412 
10 9.95 2.005 9.77 0.831 
0.80 
20 19.09 0.711 18.90 0.277 
15 15.34 0.975 13.90 0.446 
10 9.95 2.139 8.70 1.082 
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Table 18. Comparison of Information Loss Given Attribute Disclosure Risks in Bank Data 
Threshold 
g* 
Target  
MaxGSAR (%) 
l-Diversity h-Affiliation 
MaxGSAR (%) ANE  MaxGSAR (%) ANE 
0.50 
20 20.00 1.795 19.81 0.614 
15 15.79 2.222 15.69 1.208 
10 10.20 8.646 10.17 5.509 
0.67 
20 21.05 2.132 20.00 0.656 
15 20.25 7.581 15.00 1.759 
10 10.29 21.036 10.00 12.240 
0.80 
20 21.05 2.955 19.52 0.732 
15 15.13 8.402 14.64 1.922 
10 10.20 40.637 9.70 13.715 
 
9 Discussion 
MRPP is an essential aspect of many business analytics 
and big data applications. Existing data privacy 
approaches typically assume that each individual 
corresponds to a single record, which may be 
inadequate for protecting privacy in MRPP scenarios. 
The proposed approach overcomes the limitations of 
existing well-known approaches, effectively reducing 
the risk of individual-record disclosure and attribute 
disclosure in MRPP scenarios. Therefore, this research 
has significant managerial, organizational, and societal 
implications. The proposed approach should alleviate 
individuals’ concerns about loss of privacy and 
confidentiality and increase their willingness to allow 
their data to be shared for secondary uses, such as 
medical research that benefits society or personalized 
services that benefit the users themselves. It should 
also reduce organizations’ concerns about possible 
privacy violations, enabling organizations to share 
high-quality data safely for legitimate research and 
analytics purposes in a big data environment. 
The proposed approach reduces the disclosure risks in 
MRPP problems by considering individuals’ 
frequency distribution in a dataset. It balances out the 
risks of an unbalanced frequency distribution by 
assigning individuals with the same or similar 
occurrence frequencies to a QI-group. Thus, the 
advantage of this approach over traditional methods 
should be more visible when individuals’ frequency 
distribution is more unbalanced, as was observed in the 
evaluation study. The frequency distribution in the 
patient dataset was more unbalanced than that of the 
movie dataset because individuals with fewer than 20 
occurrences had been removed from the original movie 
dataset before it was released. As a result, the proposed 
approach performed better with the patient dataset than 
with the movie dataset. While removing low-
frequency individuals reduces risk caused by 
unbalanced distributions, it also results in information 
loss. Using our proposed approach, the removal of 
these low-frequency individuals from the movie 
dataset would have been unnecessary. Instead, they 
would be assigned to low-frequency QI-groups, and 
their disclosure risk could be controlled by the use of 
g-balance and h-affiliation measures. 
The proposed g-balance and h-affiliation measures are 
easy to use because of their relationships with widely 
used k-anonymity and l-diversity, respectively. In 
practice, k and l values are typically chosen between 5 
and 20 (El Emam et al. 2009, 2013; LeFevre et al., 
2006; Machanavajjhala et al., 2006; Sweeney, 2002). 
To set the threshold values g* and h* in MRPP cases, 
the user can first consider these commonly used k and 
l values and then calculates the corresponding g and h 
values based on Equations (3) and (6) for the 
thresholds. This ensures that the dataset anonymized 
with the g* and h* thresholds satisfies respective k-
anonymity and l-diversity requirements in case there is 
only a single record for an individual. 
We have considered only one sensitive attribute in this 
study, but our idea can be easily extended to cases with 
multiple sensitive attributes. When there are multiple 
sensitive attributes, h-affiliation criteria can be applied 
to each sensitive attribute in a QI-group separately. In 
the proposed algorithm, the h-affiliation is used as a 
constraint to check whether the partitioned QI-groups 
satisfy the sensitive-attribute protection requirement 
for one sensitive attribute. When there are multiple 
sensitive attributes, the h-affiliation constraint must be 
satisfied for each of those sensitive attributes. 
Computationally, this involves checking h-affiliation 
conditions multiple times in Step 2(ii) of the proposed 
algorithm (Table 5), which is easy to implement. 
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10 Conclusion  
In this study, we investigate the MRPP disclosure 
problem that is largely overlooked in the data privacy 
literature. We propose a novel approach to protect data 
against MRPP-based individual-record disclosure and 
sensitive-attribute disclosure. We demonstrate that the 
proposed approach provides significantly better 
privacy protection against MRPP disclosures than 
traditional approaches while maintaining greater data 
quality. Using the proposed approach, organizations 
can effectively evaluate and mitigate privacy risks with 
their data when an individual in the dataset has 
multiple records. 
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Appendix 
Proofs of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 
The g-balance function, 𝑔(𝑡), achieves the maximum when individuals in t are evenly distributed; i.e., when all the 
𝑐𝑖’s in equation (1) are equal to the same value c. In this case, we can write equation (1) as follows: 
 𝑔max = 1 − ∑ (
𝑐
𝑛𝑡𝑐
)
2
𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1
= 1 − ∑ (
1
𝑛𝑡
)
2
𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1
= 1 −
1
𝑛𝑡
 (A1) 
When each individual in t corresponds to a single record, 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐 = 1, ∀𝑖, and 𝑔 = 𝑔max. Substituting 𝑛𝑡 in (A1) by k, 
we obtain Equation (3) in Corollary 1. 
Theorem 1 can be proven by using proof by contradiction. Suppose Equation (2) in Theorem 1 is incorrect; that is, it 
is possible that 
𝑛𝑡  <
1
1 − 𝑔
 
 
Then, rearranging the inequality, we have 
 
𝑔 > 1 −
1
𝑛𝑡
 
 
It follows from Equation (A1) that the right-hand side is 𝑔max. So, we have 𝑔 > 𝑔max, which is a contradiction. This 
completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 1  
Let  𝑡𝑝, 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 be the parent dataset and its two subsets with 𝑛𝑡𝑝, 𝑛𝑡1and 𝑛𝑡2 the number of individuals in each set, 
respectively. Let ℎ𝑝 , ℎ1  and  ℎ2  be the corresponding h-affiliation value, and  𝑗𝑝 , 𝑗1  and  𝑗2  be the index of the 
corresponding sensitive value defined by equation (5), respectively. Let 𝑛𝑗𝑝, 𝑛𝑗1 and 𝑛𝑗2 be the number of individuals 
affiliated with  𝑗𝑝, 𝑗1 and 𝑗2, respectively. Then, 
 
  ℎ𝑝 = 𝑛𝑗𝑝/𝑛𝑡𝑝,  ℎ1 = 𝑛𝑗1/𝑛𝑡1,  ℎ2 = 𝑛𝑗2/𝑛𝑡2,  and  𝑛𝑡1 + 𝑛𝑡2 = 𝑛𝑡𝑝. 
 
We show that 
 
  ℎ𝑝 ≤ max  {ℎ1, ℎ2}.        (A2) 
  
It follows from Equation (5) that 𝑛𝑗1 + 𝑛𝑗2 ≥ 𝑛𝑗𝑝. Without loss of generality, assume ℎ1 ≤ ℎ2. Then, if ℎ𝑝 < ℎ1, (A2) 
is obtained immediately. Now, consider ℎ𝑝 ≥ ℎ1. If this is true, then 
 
 
𝑛𝑗1+𝑛𝑗2
𝑛𝑡1+𝑛𝑡2
≥
𝑛𝑗𝑝
𝑛𝑡𝑝
≥
𝑛𝑗1
𝑛𝑡1
,      𝑛𝑡1𝑛𝑗1 + 𝑛𝑡1𝑛𝑗2 ≥ 𝑛𝑡1𝑛𝑗1 + 𝑛𝑡2𝑛𝑗1,      𝑛𝑡1𝑛𝑗2 ≥ 𝑛𝑡2𝑛𝑗1 , 
  𝑛𝑡1𝑛𝑗2 + 𝑛𝑡2𝑛𝑗2 ≥ 𝑛𝑡2𝑛𝑗1 + 𝑛𝑡2𝑛𝑗2      (𝑛𝑡1 + 𝑛𝑡2)𝑛𝑗2 ≥ (𝑛𝑗1 + 𝑛𝑗2)𝑛𝑡2, 
  
𝑛𝑗2
𝑛𝑡2
≥
𝑛𝑗1+𝑛𝑗2
𝑛𝑡1+𝑛𝑡2
≥
𝑛𝑗𝑝
𝑛𝑡𝑝
. 
 
That is, ℎ𝑝 ≤ ℎ2, and (A2) is obtained. This completes the proof. 
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